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Considerable controversy exists regarding the use of drones by the United States of
America in the targeted killings of individuals overseas, including American citizens. The
constitutionality of such strikes comes into question as well as whether the President even
possesses adequate power, whether unitary or granted, to order the strikes against not only
American citizens, who are obviously protected by the Constitution, but also foreigners to
whom the Constitution may or may not apply. This study will take a look at presidential
power from the perspective of each of the three branches of government within the United
States and from the viewpoint of International Law in order to understand how much power
the President actually has to order targeted killings. This analysis is followed by a case
study. In the end, this research raises as many questions as it answers.
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GLOSSARY

Article I. The first and longest article within the Constitution of the United States of
America, which lists out the make-up and powers of both the House of Representatives and
the Senate.
Article II. The second article within the Constitution of the United States of America,
which lists out the make-up and powers of both the Executive branch of government.
Article ill. The third and shortest of the three articles that create the structure of
government in the Constitution of the United States of America, which lists out the makeup and powers of the Supreme Court.
Caroline case, An issue from 183 7 between the United States of America and Great
Britain that led to the creation of codes for the use of self-defense in warfare.
Embargo. A blockage of trade from a certain area for the purpose of political coercion.
Formalism, A way of interpreting the Constitution of the United States of America. This
interpretation allows for no leeway within the Constitution; "it means what it means."
International Court of Justice, An international court that presides over cases between
states and between states and people using international law.
Judicial Realism, A way of interpreting the Constitution of the United States of America.
The interpretation of the Constitution changes with the interpreter, with the interpreter's
culture and beliefs, and with society.
Justiciable, That an issue must be tried before a court oflaw.
Laws of War, The traditional rules of war which states must abide.
State, A country.
Suspension Clause, a section of the Constitution of the United States of America that
allows for the writ of habeas corpus to be suspended during a tin1e of war
Writ of habeas corpus, literally "bring the body here," a common law principle that
allows those who have been detained without reason to demand his or her day before an
objective decision-maker to plead his or her case.

Introduction

HOW MUCH POWER DOES THE PRESIDENCY POSSESS?

That is the question that this paper asks. This is not a question that we often consciously
ask ourselves. Usually, Presidents act and the response to that action is an assumption that
the President already possessed the authority to act in that manner. That is not necessarily
the case. There are certain limitations on Presidential power. But those limitations are
flexible, even different, depending on which perspective we look upon the Presidency. This
paper takes a look at Presidential power from four different perspectives: that of the
Supreme Court of the United States of America, that of the American Congress, that of the
American President himself1, and that of International Law.
ln order to place the analysis of the paper in context, this paper will look at drone strikes

(also known in the broad sense as a targeted killing) and the power that the President has to
order these strikes. According to a study by the United Nation's Cmmcil on Human Rights
on the use of targeted killings, there is no definition of targeted killings that is widely
agreed upon. The means of targeted killings that this paper focuses on is drone strikes. As
the study points out, targeted killings occur in wartime and peace time. The United States
of America has used drone strikes in order to commit targeted killings in Afghanistan and
Iraq. The policy that the United States uses in ordering these strikes has been kept secret
since September lith, 2001 and remain unknown to the American people. There are
allegations that the United States has used drone strikes in states other than Afghanistan
and Iraq. Between 2002 and 2010, the supposed number of drone strikes by the United
States is around 120, but there is no way to verifY this number (Rise of the Drones.)
Reports of collateral damage are also difficult to verifY, with reports varying from the tens
to the hundreds in casualties. Through it all, the United States has used a self-defense
justification for all of its drone strikes.
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The paper begins by analyzing Supreme Court cases that gwe the President nearly
unlimited power on the international scene and cases that require the President to give
minimal due process in detainment cases. One of the most important cases that influence
Presidential power is Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, which, through Justice
Jackson's concurring opinion, creates the presidential triptych of power. Using the triptych,
I explain how little Congress has said on the matter of drone strikes, which leads into the
third chapter. In the third chapter, the paper explains how the current president has defined
his own power to order drone strikes in the midst of congressional silence. The paper then
looks into what international law restrictions there may be on the President's powers. The
paper ends with a case study of the only instance where a drone strike ended the lives of
American citizens overseas and the implications that could have on the President's ability
to use drone strikes domestically.
At the end of each of the chapters in this paper, I will provide a list of questions raised by
the chapter that remain unanswered in order to demonstrate just how little is known about
drone strikes and the President's power to order drone strikes. In the conclusion, I attempt
to answer some of these questions with a case study of Al-Aulaqi
nature, this paper raises as many questions as it answers.
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Panetta. By its very

Chapter 1

THE SUPREME COURT

"Cases arising in the land or naval forces. or in the militia in time of war or
public danger, are exceptedfrom the necessity ofpresentment or indictment
by a grand jury, and the right of trial by jury in such cases is subject to the
same exception. Neither the President nor Congress nor the Judicimy can
disturb any one of the safeguards of civil liberty incorporated into the
Constitution except so far as the right is given to suspend in certain cases
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. A citizen not connected with the
milita!JI service and a resident in a State where the courts are open and in
the proper exercise or their jurisdiction cannot, even when the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus is suspended, be tried, convicted, or sentenced
otherwise than by the ordinmy courts of law. Suspension of thr' privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus does not suspend the writ itself The writ issues as
a matter of course, and, on its return, the court decides whether the
applicant is denied the right of proceeding any fUrther. A person who is a
resident of a loyal State, where he was arrested, who was never resident in
any State engaged in rebellion, nor connected with the military or naval
service. cannot be regarded as a prisoner ofwar. "
-Justice Davis, writing for the majority, Ex Parte Milligan (1866)

Section]: Wartime and Foreign Powers
The Supreme Court first began looking at the extent of Presidential powers during the Civil
War. The cases that arose out of the Civil War were titled the Prize Cases. These were a
series of cases regarding the seizure of foreign ships during an embargo imposed by the
5

President. The owners of the ships sued for the ships to be returned, claiming that because
there was no declaration of war by Congress that the embargo and therefore the sei=e of
the ships were unconstitutional. At the time of the sei=es, Congress was not in session in
order to declare that a war was occurring within the United States of America. Even if
Congress had been in session, what is of particular interest is the fact that there were no
opposing states during the Civil War, similar to the "war" today. The Civil War did not fit
the definition of war; it was an insurrection, a rebellion.
When the cases carne before the Supreme Comt of the United States, the Court decided
simplified the issue. It declared that simply because Congress has not given a name to
something does not mean it does not exist. A state of war may exist within the United
States without Congress having to declare it. At the time the ships were seized, there was
an insurrection occurring within the United States that was an imminent threat to national
security. Therefore, if the President is faced with a war (or an insurrection or a rebellion),
he can and indeed must act accordingly to protect the nation and its citizens (Prize Cases.)
In the Prize Cases, this protection carne partly in the form of an embargo. In the case of the

War on Terror, this protection carne in the form of drone strikes.
In the only dissenting opinion for the Prize Cases, it is pointed out that Congress cannot

simply delegate its powers to another branch of government. To do so would be to
completely shatter the idea of a separation of powers (Prize Cases.) That is exactly what the
Court did in the case of United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Cmporation (1936).

Curtiss-Wright deals with a Joint Resoiution of Congress and the President preventing
trade with Bolivia. Bolivia was at war at the time with Paraguay over control of the Chaco
region. The President had ordered an embargo on the country. The Curtiss-Wright Export
Corporation intended to send Bolivia fifteen machine guns, thereby breaking the embargo.
The question posed to the Supreme Court for the case was whether Congress had delegated
its powers to the President by allowing the President to impose the embargo (see the Prize
Cases dissenting opinion) and whether Congress could delegate those powers.
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The Court decided not to answer those questions directly, instead positing that while the
President was bound by the Constitution for domestic matters, that he was not bound in
international matters. The President, according to the Court, is the figurehead of the United
States for international matters and must be allowed to act depending on what is presented
on the international scene, regardless of the Constitution. The President and his aides are
often better informed about the goings-on of the international scene and are therefore better
equip to handle foreign matters without the need to release perhaps sensitive infonnation to
other branches of govennnent (Curtiss-Wright.) When this case law is applied to the idea of
using drones in foreign airspace, it is easy to conclude that the President has been given
authority to act as he sees fit. There may be information being supplied to the President that
cannot be released to the public for safety reasons or there may be threats so imminent that
to release infonnation to the public would take so much time that the threat would likely
become :reality.

Section 2: Due Process
Again, the case law starts at the time of the Civil War. During the war, the writ of habeas
corpus had been suspended, which is allowable through the Suspension Clause of the
Constitution during a time of war. Individuals were being detained without trials
throughout the duration of the war. After the conclusion of the war, an individual by the
name of Milligan was arrested and held without trial. In the case of ex parte Milligan, Mr.
Milligan fought for his writ of habeas corpus because the United States was no longer at
war. Milligan was a citizen of the United States. He was a resident of Indiana, where his
arrest had occurred. Indiana was not a battlefield state, which might have matter if the war
was still going on, but there was not even a state of war occurring within the United States
anymore. The federal courts were open and in use at the time of his arrest. Mr. Milligan
had, however, been seen by a military tribunal (Milligan.)
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A military tribunal was not enough, the Court ruled. Mr. Milligan was a citizen and
therefore was entitled to his due process before he was held against his will by his
government. When the government of the United States wants to deprive someone of their
freedom and hold them, there must be due process given. When that person is a citizen and
the federal courts are open, that due process must be given before an Article Ill court, not a
military tribunal (Milligan.) That runs again in the vein of the Executive asking the
Executive's permission to detain someone. This can be again tied to drone strikes. This
case seems to indicate that the President cannot deprive at least a citizen of the United
States ofhis or her life while there is no war and the federal courts remain open.
The next case occurs near the end of World War II. In the case of ex parte Quirin, there
were a group of eight German nationals who had been spying in the United States for
G=any and were charged multiple times with different violations of the laws of war. Two
of the saboteurs were American citizens, though neither are the namesake of the case. The
case was tried before a military tribunal, like in ex parte Milligan. At the end of their trial,
all eight were found guilty of the charges of violating the laws of war and all eight were
given death sentences. Six of the saboteurs were executed by electric chair seven days after
trial concluded. One of the saboteurs, George John Dasch, had his sentence commuted to
thirty years in prison for assisting in the capture of the other saboteurs. Another, one of the
two Americans Ernest Peter Burger, had his sentence commuted to a life sentence for his
aid in the capture of the other saboteurs. The other An1erican had been executed (Quirin.)
The Supreme Court ruled that in the case of ex parte Quirin, the military tribunal was
constitutional. These were individuals who had sworn allegiance to a hostile state and were
being held lawfully; they did not have a right to trial in a civilian Article III court. The
President was within his right to order that the saboteurs be tried by military hibunal
(Quirin.) The Court went so far as to draw several distinctions between Milligan and
Quirin, stating that the Germans had willfully entered the United States as agents of an

enemy to attempt to sabotage fue United States. In contrast, Milligan was not acting as pmi
of the Confederate State of America nor did he live in or near the Confederacy. When
8

applied to the idea of drone strikes, perhaps a strike on a citizen could be justified. If that
citizen has pledged allegiance to a foreign enemy and is actively working against the
United States in a time of war, there could be means to try this person by military tribunal
(Quirin.) But there is no precedent set in this case for absolutely no due process
whatsoever.
According to the Court's application of the Authorization for Use of Military Force Act in

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (2004), enemy combatants have limited access to the court system in
the United States. However, the status does not preclude all access to due process. The
Executive branch of government may augment or abridge the usual amount of due process
afforded to enemy combatant so as to not add unnecessary stress to the military by
requiring the removal of certain officials from the field of battle for a trial. There are issues
that may occur when a person is given their due process rights through an Article III court
including the possibility that secrets may be leaked and that there might not be sufficient
evidence under those burdens to hold an enemy combatant. The release of that person back
onto the battlefield may put Americans in danger (Hamdi.)
The Executive carmot refuse all due process to an individual (Hamdi.) The level of due
process required in Hamdi is important for citizens of the United States. If declared an
enemy combatant, the government must at least allow the person access to counsel and a
chance to present exculpatory evidence. The trial of a citizen enemy combatant must be
done before a neutral decision maker (Hamdi.) It is important to note that the decision in
Hamdi was a plurality opinion and not a majority opinion. Under the rules of precedent, it
is technically not binding.
What is binding is the decision in the case of Boumediene

1'.

Bush (2008). Between Hamdi

and Boumediene, the Court ruled on Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2006) (which ruled that the
military tribunals set up by the Bush administration violated multiple sections Geneva
Conventions) which spurred the creation of the Military Commission Act of2006. The Act
set up military tribunals that addressed the concerns of the Court brought up in the Hamdi
and Hamdan cases. The Court ruled in Boumediene that both citizens and foreign terror
9

suspects have the right to challenge their detainment and are deserving of due process. This
case is important in understanding the legality of drone strikes. In depriving a person a life,
a drone strike order is not sent before a military tribunal. It is the sole decision of the
Executive and his or her advisors. But the Supreme Court has ruled that even just detaining
individuals needs to be seen befme a military tribunal at least (Boumediene.) This logically
calls into question the legality and constitutionality of the drone strikes being ordered.
The Supreme Court has not yet seen a case that deals with drones in any capacity due to the
newness of the technology. There is no concrete jurisprudence to indicate how the
President should act with regard to drones and drone strikes. Instead there is case law
regarding how restricted the President's actions are depending on the actions of Congress:
the concurring opinion of Justice Jackson in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer. The
application of the case to drones, which will be explained in the following chapter, can give
the President an indication on how much or how little room he has to order the strikes.

Remaining Questions:
l. Could the President use his war powers without a formal declaration of war by

Congress?
2. When then does the issue of drone strikes become international and when is it
domestic?
3. Is a state of war dispositive to whether someone receives a trial by an Article Ill
court? Is citizenship?
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4. If an individual who is not a citizen of the United States of America has a right to
challenge their detainment with a form of due process, how could that same
individual not have a right to the same due process before they are killed?
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Chapter 2

YOUNGSTOWN SHEET & TUBE CO. V SAWYER

"The actual art of governing under our Constitution does not, and cannot.
conform to judicial definitions of the power of any of its branches based on
isolated clauses, or even single Articles torn fi'om context. While the
Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates
that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable
government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence,
autonomy but reciprocity. Presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate
depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress. "
-Justice Jackson, in his concurring opinion, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.

Sal>\Yer (1942)
Perhaps the most important Supreme Court case that deals with Presidential war powers is
the case of Youngsto·wn Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sa11yer. Known as the Steel Seizure Case, it
occurred during the Korean War era. In this chapter, we will use the case in order to
analyze Congress and the powers it has granted the President over the years. In the case, the
President aimed to take control of steel production within the United States of America in
order to mitigate the effects of a potential strike upon the war effort.
The majority opinion in the case is less important than is the concurring opinion by Justice
Jackson. In that opinion, Justice Jackson creates a system for determining the extent of
power a President possesses at any particular time, on any particular issue. It is broken into
three parts:
"1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization

of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he
possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate. In these
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circumstances, and in these only, may he be said (for what it may be worth)
to personify the federal sovereignty. If his act is held uuconstitutional under
these circumstances, it usually means that the Federal Government, as an
uudivided whole, lacks power. A seizure executed by the President pursuant
to an Act of Congress would be supported by the strongest of presumptions
and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation, and the burden of
persuasion would rest heavily upon any who might attack it.
2. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or
denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but
there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent
authority, or in which its distribution is uucertain. Therefore, congressional
inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least, as a practical
matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential
responsibility. In this area, any actual test of power is likely to depend on the
imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables, rather ihan on
abstract theories oflaw.
3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or
implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely
only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of
Congress over the matter. Courts can sustain exclusive presidential control
in such a case only by disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject.
Presidential claim to a power at once so conclusive and preclusive must be
scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the equilibrium established
by our constitutional system (Youngstown.)"
That is to say, simply, the President's power depends on Congress.
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Section I: When the President Acts Agaii1st Congress' Wish
At this point, when the President acts against Congress' expressed wishes, the President has
his own Article I power, minus whatever powers Congress has taken from the President.
This is when the President is the most limited in the actions that he or she may take.
In 1975, Congress created a committee called the United States Senate Select Committee to
Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, otherwise !mown
as the Church Committee. This committee looked into the intelligence agencies that existed
in the United States, including the Central Intelligence Agency (C.I.A.), the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (F.B.I.), and the National Security Agency (N.S.A.). The committee also
investigated the technology being used by these agencies. The committee was a reaction to
the occurrences in the Watergate Scandal. As a result of the committee, Senator Frank
Church, after whom the committee was named, stated that
"In the need to develop a capacity to !mow what potential enem1es are
doing, the United States government has perfected a technological capability
that enables us to monitor the messages that go through the air. Now, that is
necessary and important to the United States as we look abroad at enemies
or potential enemies. We must know, at the same time, that capability at any
time could be turoed around on the American people, and no American
would have any privacy left such is the capability to monitor everythingtelephone conversations, telegrams, it doesn't matter. There would be no
place to hide.
"If this government ever became a tyrant, if a dictator ever took charge in
this country, the technological capacity that the intelligence community has
given the government could enable it to impose total tyranny, and there
would be no way to fight back because the most careful effort to combine
together in resistance to the government, no matter how privately it was
done, is within the reach of the government to know (Church.)"
14

He declared that he never wanted the day to come where this technology being used by the
intelligence agencies was used on American citizens. Today, it is common knowledge that
the N.S.A. monitors the phones of all American citizens. President Obama has publicly
stated his intentions to begin to monitor fewer phones. In order to promote national
security, the President and the agencies under his control are collecting data from the
Internet and from phones. There are no wan·ants for this information and Congress has
expressed its fear of this use of the teclmology for years. The intelligence agencies that are
using this information can use this information, if they feel it necessary, to place people on
terrorist lists and/or kill lists (Al-Aulaqi.) These lists include individuals who may pose
terrorist threats to the national security of the United States and in some cases are the
threats posed are so large that these individuals have become the victims in drone strikes.
This is the President acting against Congressional wishes, but oddly without consequen.ce.
This brings the discussion into Congressional silence and how much power the President
has when Congress has not yet acted.

Section 2: When the President Acts During Congressional
Silence
This paper has already discussed the aft=ath of what has occurred when the President
acts in the midst congressional silence. Looking back at the Prize Cases, the President does
not necessarily become frozen and unable to act upon threats because Congress has not yet
recognized the threat. Congress did later declare a state of war was present in the Prize
Cases when the President acted. This does not diminish the fact that the President did act
during Congressional silence in a way that may or may not have been permissible at the
time. Acting in congressional silence puts the President in a state of limbo. There is no
clear definition of his power in this case. This may arguably give the President to act
however he chooses. The President can state that necessity and an inability to wait for
Congress to say a word about the actions being taken in order to preserve the Union
required the actions taken.

15

Article II of the Constitution of the United States makes the President the Commander in
Chief of the Armed Forces. The President may use the Armed Forces in times of war.
However, the President lacks to power to declare war; that power was given to Congress in
Article I of the Constitution. When looking for an authorization from Congress of the
President's use of drone strikes, one can fmd a handful of bills attempting to prevent either
the use of drones upon American citizens within the United States or bills attempting to
prevent the use of drones altogether. None of those bills have passed both houses of
Congress. There is, therefore, no definitive word on whether the President can or cannot
use drones and no word on what Congress thinks of the use of drones on American citizens.
There are arguments that can be made that because Congress has att=pted to ban the use
of drones that drones are indeed unconstitutional. This argument is easily dismissed by the
fact that if Congress as a whole (or as a majority) believed that the use of drones was
impermissible, it would have been successful in banning them. The other argument is that
because Congress has tried to and failed to pass a ban on the use of drones, that Congress
therefore approves the use of drones. This is an argument less easy to dispel, as it may well
be true. It may be a stretch to say that because Congress has not said anything on the matter
that it must approve of the matter. But as we have already seen, in absence of
Congressional action and it deemed "necessary", the President is free to use his discretion
when deciding to use extra-Constitutional powers.

Section 3: When the President Acts

111

Concert 1-vith Congress

When the President acts wish Congress' blessing, then, accmding to Justice Jackson's
triptych of presidential power, the President has his entire Article I powers and any of the
powers Congress has granted him out of Article II of the Constitution. The President
embodies the will of the federal govemment at this point and can act knowing that his
actions are within his power to act.

16

The only bill that the 113th Congress has passed regarding drones is the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014. The National Defense Authorization Act has been
repassed by Congress each year it has been introduced since its first introduction in 2004.
For the fiscal year 2014, the only section that mentions drones in the entire 1104 page
document is Section 1264 which calls for the prevention of the use of drones against U.S.
citizens. There is an exception: if an American citizen is found to be actively engaged in
combat against the United States of America (H.R. 1960.) The section fails to define what
would be active engagement or what combat would count as. The exception does not
mention whether a strike within the borders of the United States would be unacceptable.
This demonstrates the confusion that still surrounds the grant of power to the President to
use targeted killings. Congress has taken the time to define who the President may not,
generally, use drone strikes against: citizens who are not enemy belligerents. However,
Congress has failed to define an enemy belligerent in the National Defense Authorization
Act, where the prohibition can be found. With the definition of enemy belligerent in
question, the President can strike anyone he finds to either is A) not a citizen of the United
States and/or B) an enemy belligerent.
Congress has specifically allowed for any means necessary to bring those involved in 9111
to justice. This would include drone strikes if that was declared a necessary means by the
President. Within the Authorization for Use of Military Force Act, passed right after and in
reaction to the 9/11 attack, Congress grants the President power to use the Armed Forces.
The Act is not a declaration of war. This creates an issue when the President begins using
his or her war powers in order to bring those involved in the attack to justice.
It would appear that in the current instance the President's power floats somewhere in

between acting during congressional silence and acting with congressional approval. There
has not been a finn disapproval of the President's actions with regards to drone strikes, nor
has there been a firm approval. This would place the President in the second tier of the
triptych of power. However Congress has granted the President some wartime power. With
the A.U.M.F. and the National Defense Authorization Act (N.D.A.A.), the President can
17

act to secure the nation and take down those individuals who are associated with either al
Qaeda or the Taliban. It is not clear how much evidence the President must have in order
for the A.U.M.F. to apply or if there is any evidence that must be presented at all. The
President has claimed, as recently as 2013, that he will refuse to expand the A.U.M.F. any
further and that he will not use drones to attack American people on American soil
(National Defense University Speech.)
Neither the court system nor the legislature has specifically addressed the issue of drone
strikes or how much power the President has to order drone strikes. While there has been
some legislation to give the President general wartime powers, there is very little specific to
drones. Even then, vagueness of wording leaves questions as to how restricted the
President's powers are. In the next chapter, this paper will explore how the current
President, Barack H. Obama, has filled in the gap left by the legislature and the courts with
his own definition ofhis powers.

Remaining Questions:
I. Does the President have the authorization of Congress to attack people using drones
in states in which no battles are occurring, such as Yemen and Pakistan?
2. What are the limitations of the Authorization for Use of Military Force Act and
when will it no longer be in effect?
3. Will Congress pass a bill making the use of drone strikes on American citizens or
on American soil illegal?
4. Can the President order a strike on American soil?
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Chapter 3

THE CASE OF PRESIDENT BARACK H. OBAMA

" ... Our operation in Pakistan [the S.E.A.L. Team 6 Operation} against
Osama bin Laden cannot be the norm. The risks in that case were
immense ... The fact that we did not find ourselves confronted with civilian
casualties. or embroiled in an extended fir~fight, was a testament to the
meticulous planning and professionalism of our Special Forces, but it also
depended on some luck. And it was supported by massive infi·astructure in
Afghanistan. And even then, the cost to our relationship with Pakistan and the backlash among the Pakistani public over encroachment on their
territory -was so severe that we are just now beginning to rebuild this
important partnership. So it is in this context that the United States has
taken lethal, target action against a/ Qaeda and its associated forces,
including with remoteZv piloted aircraft commonly

r~ferred to

as drones. "

-President Barack H. Obama in a speech at the National Defense
University on March 23'd, 2013
One of the campaign promises of current President Barack Obama was ending the wars in
which the United States was involved. Since taking office in 2009, President Obama has
decreased the number of soldiers on the ground in both Iraq and Afghanistan. He has also
increased the number of drones in the arsenal of the United States of America. Under this
president, there has been an increase in the number of targeted killings by the United States
using Predator drones. The President admits that he seeks to take down AI Qaeda through
the use of drones (National Defense University Speech.) By comparison, the administration
of fonner President George W. Bush did not use drones quite as much as the current
administration. Many argue that this is hypocrisy on President Obama's part (H.R. 2647;
H.R. 1960.) However, something else explains the change: the fact that the Central
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Jntelligence Agency had not yet created a reliable intelligence presence within Afghanistan
and Pakistan. The drone technology was being used by Israel during the Bush
administration and was relatively new.
The newness of the technology is one of the reasons that its use is so controversial. There
are no domestic or international laws of war that exist that rules over the use of drones.
Knowledge about specific policies governing the use of drones in targeted killings is
tenuous at best. The laws and morals that may one day rules over use of this technology
have not yet been hammer out2 . There are no reports on how drones are used, how they are
used on, or how the government decides to use them and on whom.
In a speech to the National Defense University on 23 May 2013, the President claimed that
"by the end of 2014, we will no longer have the same need for force protection, and the
progress we've made against core a! Qaeda will reduce the need for unmanned strikes."
However, the budget for unmanned drones has increased nearly nine million dollars since
the last National Defense Authorization Act was passed by the !12th Congress (H.R. 4310.)
The budget for drones was nearly doubles in the National Defense Authorization Act
passed by the 111 111 Congress (H.R. 2647.) It is, however, important to note while looking
at these numbers that not all drones are used for targeted strikes. Some drones are simply
used for intelligence gathering or security that may in turn lead to an increase in strikes.
ln that same speech to the National Defense University, President Obama lays out some

convincing arguments in favor of the use of drones. He points out that having troops on the
ground can cause hostility among local inhabitants. While having American soldiers on
foreign soil is not necessarily an invasion, it is visually very difficult to tell the difference.
Using drones in operations to kill or capture a! Qaeda operatives is, supposedly, less likely
to incite the locals in the country in which the strike occurs (National Defense University
Speech.) How a ground troop operation would incite people any more or less than an
umuanned Predator drone dropping out of the sky to eliminate a threat is uncleaL This also
less of a 1isk to our soldiers, as the operator of the drone is not actually within the line of
fire of the enemy (National Defense University Speech.) The operative is safe within the
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boundaries of the United States of America. The victim of a drone strike does not receive
due process as prescribed by Article III of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights.
In the speech the President also claims that the drone strikes he has ordered have been

effective and that they have foiled the plots of terrorists many times over (National Defense
University Speech.) However, there is no report on just how effective these strikes are.
There are no definitive reports on how much collateral causality these drone strikes have
caused. He claims that these strikes have saved lives, but at what cost to the lives of others?
The President also points out the legality of his actions. He mentions that just following the
attacks on the Twin Towers in New York on September 11'h, 2001, Congress passed an act
(the Authorization for Use of Military Force Act) that allowed the President to pursue any
necessary actions to bring people associated with those attacks to justice. The act has
expanded Presidential power immensely over the past 13 years. President Obama points
out that the act means that " ... the United States of America is at war with al Qaeda, the
Taliban, and their associated force." (National Defense University Speech.) But there must
be a declaration of war by Congress in order for that to be true. There has been no such
declaration. Likely, there will not be.
Congress at this point has given the President the authority to make use of the Armed
Forces. The issue that emerges is that the Constitution only gives him the authority to use
the Armed Forces when Congress declares war. If one takes a formalistic interpretation of
the Constitution, then this means that the President does not have the authority to send any
troops anywhere or to use drones strikes in order to kill enemies of the state. This is
because there has been no formal declaration of war. Even then, the traditional laws of war
apply when two or more states are fighting each otl1er. They have never before been
applied to a terrorist organization that exists without a state or a govermnent. It becomes
difficult, under the traditional laws of war, to call "The War on Terror" an actual war.
President Obama points out that the ability to use these strikes in self-defense does not
make their use moral or ethical. He mentions that his administration has created a
document that rules over the use of drones. While the document in its entirety has not been
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made available to the public, a summarizing document has been. In the document, titled

U.S. Policy Standards and Procedures for the Use of Force in Counterterrorism
Operations Outside the United States and Areas of Active Hostilities, there is an abridged
version of the process that the President and his administration go through in order to
decide when and where to use strikes and on whom. The proposed attack must have a legal
basis, the target must be a "continuous, imminent tlueat" (which the Executive determines),
and the attack must be done with respect to international law and the sovereignty of the
state in which the attack with occur. There is also a list of crite1ia that must be met:
"l) Near certainty that the tenorist target is present;
2) Near certainty that non-combatants will not be injured or killed;
3) An assessment that capture is not feasible at the time of the operation;
4) An assessment that the relevant governmental authorities in the country
where action is contemplated cannot or will not effectively address the
threat to U.S. persons; and
5) An assessment that no other reasonable alternatives exist to effectively
address the threat to U.S. persons. (U.S. Policy Standards and Procedures
for the Use of Force in Counterten·orism Operations Outside the United
States and Areas of Active Hostilities.)"
The decision will be made by senior officials in the United States govemment and special
agencies with sensitive knowledge. There is no mention of any form of judicial review of
the cases to ensure due process is properly given. This internal process allows the
Executive Branch to give itself permission to act. The President does claim in his speech
that he and his administration inforn1 Congress of their intention to act and ask for opinions
there. However, those opinions are not restrictive with the pem1issions that the President
has already received. Nor is asking Congress' permission a sufficient substitute to the due
process given by an Alticle III comt.
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The President later goes on to speak on the fact that he does not believe it would be
constitutional for him to attack American citizens on American soil (National Defense
University Speech.) He has, however, order an attack on an American citizen on foreign
soil, which will be discussed in the final chapter of this paper.
In the midst of congressional silence on the President's actions with regard to drone strikes,
the President has stepped up to define his own power. While claiming that he is seeking
opinions on the legality of strikes per each individual he seeks to target, he has given no
evidence of contacting a court to review the legality. If constitutional law and federal law
don't restrict the President's power, perhaps international law will.

Remaining Questions:
1. Will the operators of unmanned drones in the United States continue to be as safe as
they are now once the use of drones is more wide-spread?
2. How accurate are drones?
3. How many drone strikes have occurred to date and where have they occurred?
4. Does the use of drone strikes really cause less hostility toward the United States
than having troops on the ground?
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Chapter 4

INTERNATIONAL LAW

" ... A peremptory norn1 of general international law is a norm accepted and
recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a nmm
from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a
subsequent norm of general international law having the same character."
-Article 53: Treaties Conflicting With A Preemptory Norm Of General
International Law ("JUS COGENS"), Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties (1969)
International law is a series of agreed upon conventions and treaties between states. Some
of the most important of international laws are those called jus cogen. These jus cogen are
essentially international laws that arc so basic that they are universally agreed upon by the
states that are part of the international scene. Examples ofjus cogen are the bans on torture,
on the use of chemical and biological weapons in warfare, on slavery, and on genocide.
There can be no derivation away from the bans on these, in theory. A state cannot violate
jus cogen in a treaty or convention. No state can deviate from them. In practice, there are

still violations ofjus cogen. around the world.
According to a meeting of legal experts that were called befme the United States
Congressional hearing regarding unmanned drone attacks, the only time targeted killings
can be used is when they are used by trained military or military personnel during an armed
conflict or war. This raises questions of whether strikes in a theater of war are different
from strikes that occur while not at war. The meeting, dubbed 'Rise of the Drones', declare
that the use of targeted killings is also legal in the case of self-defense. Even so, the legality
of the use of drones becomes blurry when the conflict is not international

OT

when the

conflict deals with an organization and not a state. Current international law does not
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discuss the legality of attacks from entities that are not states. This makes the cun-ent War
on Terror a difficult issue to find precedent for guidance.
During the meeting, experts confirmed the legality of the use of targeted killings in the case
of targeting the leader of a state or a government as pertains to the Laws of War. They
explained that the question of morality may not necessarily line up with legality. The
experts on the panel then discussed that drones were moral due to their ability to
discriminate between targets, or at least the drone technician's abilitl (Rise of the Drones.)
However, the parameters given during the Rise of the Drones meeting create more
questions regarding the use of drones. Victims of drone strikes do not receive adequate due
process. These targeted killings are essentially for political reasons; an argument could be
made that that makes them assassinations. Would it ever be legal to target someone off of
the battlefield and how far away from the battlefield would that extend? What defines a
military or military personnel? Are strikes limited to those that are part of that military or
could citizens be attacked as well? If you can strike citizens, then the next logical tr·ain of
thought goes to who can you strike and for what reason? What actions must a citizen
perform to qualify for death by drone? Accmding to 10 U.S.C. § 948 (a) (7) an enemy
belligerent is any who engages in hostilities against the United States or has helped
someone else engage in hostilities against the United States or was a part of AI Qaeda or
was previously defined as an enemy belligerent When a civilian meets this definition, they
are considered to be part of the fighting. When they join the fray, they are just as open to
attack as any soldier. There is no data that indicates how accurate targeted drone strikes are.
There is no data that supports the fact that every drone strike is successful in destroying the
intended target The system for deciding who is a civilian, who is an enemy belligerent, and
who is a target is unknown.
While it is possible to argue that targeted killings are not assassinations and that they do not
take away someone' s right to trial, there is not a Jot of evidence to support those two
claims. The only apparent argument for targeted killings not being synonymous with
assassination is that targeted killings are legal and assassinations are illegal. There is no

fundamental difference between the two otherwise and the legality of targeted killings is in
question in current international law. Targeted killings also do not include trials to prove
the guilt of the person being targeted (MacDonald.) In a presentation given by Lord
MacDonald at Wadham College at Oxford University, he pointed out that a lot of the time
the Central Intelligence Agency gives money to individuals for the names of potential
tetmrists. The large sum of money is tempting for many in countries where targeted
killings are performed, with widespread warfare and poverty (MacDonald.) Names may be
given just for the money, but also for petty reasons like revenge and names are difficult for
the Central Intelligence Agency to verify. A strike is proposed, according to Lord
MacDonald, if the name of an individual is given multiple times from different sources.
However, as Amos Guiora points out in his paper "Targeted Killing as Active SelfDefense", in theory "an individual will only be targeted if he presents a serious threat to
public order and safety based on criminal evidence and/or reliable, corroborated
intelligence information clearly implicating him." Despite this, no trials occur. Nor is there
any warning of the attack given (Guiora.)
The legality of taking target killings off the battlefield and into everyday life is
questionable to say the least. The targeting of civilians is also questionable, as is the
collateral damage that comes with targeted killing of any one person. Civilians may be
targeted only when they are involving themselves voluntarily in the fire fight and/or
violence of a battlefield according to international law. They may also be targeted if a
government has reason to believe that there is an imminent threat that this citizen poses,
4

such as a potential suicide bombing threat • This is generally the justification used when
states are targeting terrorists. When these terrorists attack, they are considet·ed hostile and
are therefore viable for targeted killing by a state capable of such an action. In such cases, a
self-defense exception may be justified.
However, like the Caroline case describes, the threat the citizen poses must be imminent,
"instant, overwhehrring, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.,.
The Caroline case occurred in 1837 between the United States of America m1d Great
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Britain and led to the creation of codes for the use of self-defense in warfare. The definition
of self-defense brings into question the United States' use of drones in targeted killings of
terrorists over the past decade. Take a look, for example, at the Authorization for Use of
Military Force Act. In the A.U.M.F., Congress has given the President full authorization to
use any means to bring those involved in the 9111 attacks to justice. That would count as
self-defense, to prevent further attacks. A decade of self-defense in reaction to one act does
not fit that definition.
Some argue that by performing targeted killings now, even if they are illegal as it currently
stands in international law, their continued use will lead to their becoming legal later as
more states enter the practice. It also becomes easier to enter the practice of targeted
killings when drones are involved. As Lord MacDonald pointed out in his presentation,
being able to direct a Predator drone from thousands of miles away as if playing a video
game provides for complete safety for the operator of the drone. For now, the operator has
no threat of attack. This level of safety may change as drone technology proliferates, or if
countries using drones are close enough to each other that other means of warfare may put
the operator in banns-way (MacDonald.) When there is literally no 'threat of casualty to a
country's troops that country will logically be more willing to utilize the drones in targeted
killings and more willing to enter into conflicts, !mowing that this technology is at the
ready.
The last issue that occurs with targeted killings is the efficiency of their use. Claims that
drone attacks are nearly 100 per cent accurate cannot be confim1ed. Reports of collateral
damage are unverified and are hard to rely on due to the difficult task of identifying who is
a hostile citizen and who is an innocent citizen. In any case, it also becomes difficult to
justify the killing of any number of innocent civilians. It is quite obvious that the
destruction of an entire city or the death of thousands in order to kill one hostile is
outt·ageous, but what is the actual cut off point? There has been no measure yet proposed.
All there is to go on is that the extreme of thousands of deaths for one hostile death would
mostly likely not allowed. The targeted attacks must be proportional, but there has been no
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definition of what would be proportional or how to go about minimizing the damage from
attacks. Without information on exactly how accurate the drones used in targeted killing
really are, the task of defining proportionality and a method of minimizing damage remains
difficult, if not impossible.
There is very little international law that addresses specifically the use of drone strikes. It is
also difficult to enforce international law and to punish violations, especially violations by
an economically powerful country like the United States. The next chapter deals with a
real-life situation in which a drone strike occurred and caused the deaths of three American
citizens.

Remaining Questions:
1. Under international law,

IS

the use of drones extrajudicial execution? Is it

assassination?
2. Can the operative using an unmanned drone in a targeted killing be arrested and
tried for murder or, at the very least, assault?
3. How can countries with frrm belief in and laws regarding due process condone
targeted killings?
4. How does the United States define "hostilities against the United States" and
"enemy belligerent"?
5. How many degrees of separation away fi-om a terrorist place someone far enough
away to not qualify as "a part of AI Qaeda"?
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6. Can the United States legally use a drone strike that would kill people who are not
soldiers and are not enemy belligerents in order to kill someone who was? If so,
how many can the United States kill to kill the intended target?
7. How many civilians die when drone strikes are unsuccessful and how can those
unsuccessful strikes be justified?
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Chapter 5

THE CASE OF AL-AULAQIV. PANETTA

Anwar Al-Aulaqi was an American and Yemeni citizen. He was born within the United
States. At the time of his death, he was in Yemen, in a car. He was targeted in a drone
strike and killed in Yemen in 2012. Before this he had allegedly been placed on both a
C.I.A. and Joint Special Operations Command, or J.S.O.C., kill list. A case occurred in
2010, Al-Aulaqi v. Obama that had contested Al-Aulaqi's inclusion on the kill lists. The
issue there was that the government never explained (and still has yet to explain) the
imminent threat that Al-Aulaqi posed that warranted his placement on those lists.
According to the government of the United States of America, Al-Aulaqi was the leader of
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula or A.Q.A.P. Al-Aulaqi was also involved in the
planning of the Christmas Day underwear bomber attack. The defense in the Al-Aulaqi v.

Panetta case alleges that Al-Aulaqi provided the underwear bomber (who attempted to
detonate a bomb hidden in his underwear while on board a flight from Amsterdam to
Detroit on Christmas Day 2009) with the means and instructions to cany out the intended
terrorist attack.
The Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta case brings up interesting questions about the ability of the
Executive to target American citizens in drone strikes. As we have discussed in the chapter
on the legislature, in the past Congress attempted to make it illegal to target U.S. citizens in
drone strikes. Congress failed to pass a law on this so far, but in attempting to do so, it
declares, in theory, that the Executive does indeed have this right. Otherwise, how could
Congress take away that right tlu·ough the creation of a law? Congress has also authorized
the use of military force in order to take down Al-Qaeda. If Al-Aulaqi was indeed an
active, high-ranking member of Al-Qaeda, military action against him was already
authorized.
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A set of questions, however, also anses out of the citizenship status of AI-Aulaqi.
According to the Plaintiff in the case, the Defendants (Leon C. Panetta, William H.
McRaven, Joseph Vote!, and David. H Petraeus) violated the 41h and 5tl' Amendments to the
Constitution along with violating the Clause on the Bill of Attainder. This issue therefore
seems to be justiciable by the Court. But in response to the complaint filed by the Plaintiff,
the Defendants claimed that the issue was a political question and was therefore out of
reach of the Courts to decide.
The government framed the question of the Plaintiff, in their Motion to Dismiss, as whether
" ... U.S. officials unlawfully applied the warmaking and national defense powers of the
political branches to conduct alleged missile strikes abroad against enemy forces engaged
in an armed conflict against the United States ... '' In order to evaluate the political question
claim, the Defendants look to the Supreme Court case of Baker v. Carr. In the case, there
are six ways to determine whether a court case is justiciable or whether it includes a nonjusticiable political question: that the issue being raised has a "demonstrable constitutional
commitment" to the branches of government, or that the issue has no standard by which it
may be resolved, or that prima fascia the issue is clearly not for the Court to decide, or that
the issue would require the Court to show a lack of respect to the other branches or
government, or that the issue, for whatever reason, creates "an nnusual need for
unquestioning adherence to a" handling of the issue by a separate branch of the
government, or, finally, that the issue may "embarrass" the other branches of government.
The Defense uses the Baker argument to state that when the Plaintiff asks the Court to
determine whether the threat posed by AI-Aulaqi was imminent, they ask the Court to
decide on a political, not a legal, question. Al-Aulaqi was in a car at the time of his death.
There is nothing in the literature on the case that would suggest that Al-Aulaqi was at the
time of his death attacking or that he was committing any act that would create an
inuninent threat to national security in the United States. There is also nothing in the
literature that suggests that he was not engaged in anything posing an imminent threat to
the national security of the United States. However, if Al-Aulaqi had been brought before
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an Article III court to determine whether he was or was not an imminent threat, the burden
would not be with Al-Aulaqi to prove he was not a threat, but on the state to prove he was.
In order to deprive him of his life, the state would have had to have met a high burden of
proof: beyond a reasonable doubt. Even if the case was seen before a military tribunal, AlAulaqi would have been able to present evidence before the tribunal in support of his
innocence and would have had access to legal counsel, according to the cases of Hamdi,

Hamdan, and Boumediene, as discussed in Chapter 2. The Plaintiff also claims that the
Defendants had means other than deadly force in order to halt Al-Aulaqi's potentially
harmful actions.
The first issue that the Plaintiff brings in their complaint against the Defendants is a
violation of the 4th Amendment. The 4'11 Amendment to the Constitution protects citizens of
the United States against unreasonable searches and seizures of property by the government
without the due process of the law. The seizure that the Plaintiff argues to have occurred is
a seizure of life, which was the property of Al-Aulagi. The next issue brought by the
Plaintiff against the Defendants is a violation of the 5th Amendment. The 5'11 Amendment of
the Constitution allows for, along with the well-known right against being compelled to
self-incriminate, just compensation when the government of the United States seizes
something, in this case a life. The final issue brought by the Plaintiff against the Defendants
is the violation of the Bill of Attainder Clause. The Clause is within Article I, Section 9 of
the Constitution. A Bill of Attainder is an act by a legislature that declares a specific person
or a group guilty of a criminal act. As has been discussed throughout this paper a
legislature summarily declaring someone guilty would be a violation of due process. It
would remove the Article III court from being used to determine the guilt or innocence of a
person. While in this case, Congress didn't declare Al-Aulagi guilty, the Executive branch
did and so did the intelligence agencies upon whose kill lists Al-Aulagi was placed.
The Plaintiff has argued that a Bivens solution is warranted in the case, meaning that
despite the fact that there is no federal statute that the govermnent violated. that the
Constitutional amendment violation creates a cause of action against the government. In the

actual Bivens 1'. Six Unlmown Named Agents case (1971), Mr. Bivens was arrested without
a warrant by the six federal agents. When his case went before a court, Mr. Bivens claimed
that his

4th

Amendment rights against unreasonable search and seizure had been violated.

The counsel for the agents argued that the 4tl' Amendment did not apply as Bivens claimed
it did and instead said that only state laws regarding privacy applied. When the case went
before the Supreme Court, the Court ruled that the 4th Amendment did indeed apply to the
case and damages can be awarded in a case where constitutional amendments have been
violated (Bivens.)
The case of Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta was argued in front of the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia on Friday, June 19th, 2013. On January 24th, 2014, the Court
ordered that the Plaintiff bring more evidence to some why Al-Aulaqi was such an
imminent threat to the United States of America. Since that date, there have been no
updates on the case and the case has gone in camera, meaning that it is taking place behind
the doors of the Judge's chambers. There is no certainty as to when or if a ruling on the
case will be published.
The implications of the case are great. First, it is an attack on an American citizen on
foreign soil. The citizen was not placed before an Article III court in order to plead his case.
There was no ability to present exculpatory evidence, no access to counsel, and no neutral
decision maker, which are the due processes that the Supreme Court have said are at least
due in cases where liberty is being taken away. It is logical to think that at least this much
due process, if not more, is necessary to take a person's life away.
The files on Al-Aulaqi and his activities, the Defense tells the Court, was seen by some of
the top military personnel in the counh-y and was reviewed by the Department of Justice.
The Department of Justice is indeed required to review any potential lethal use of force
against a United States citizen regardless of where they are located. One must keep in mind
though that the Department of Justice is part of the Executive branch of the government,
not part of the judicim-y branch. The issue becomes the Executive asking the Executive to
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review whether or not the Executive should be allowed to end the life of an American
citizen. There is no check on the power of the Executive then.
Al-Aulaqi was not placed before a military tribunal either. None of the information on his
actions that were such imminent threats has been released. He had been considered an
imminent threat since 2010. He spent two years on C.I.A. and J.S.O.C. kill lists before he
was finally killed in a drone strike. The drone strike also killed the other individuals in the
car, including another American citizen. This is a clear violation of what even the most
recent cases regarding due process have called for (Harndi; Hamdan; Boumediene.) We see
that even as recently at 2008, even those who are not citizens must have some form of due
process before they are detained. It is not too far out to assume that a citizen of the United
States must have some form of due process before his or her life is taken from him or her.
It is also important to note that this case also includes the death of Al-Aulaqi's son, a

minor, in a separate attack. The attack occurred after Al-Aulaqi's death and again occurred
in Yemen. Al-Aulaqi's son was not the target. The target was not actually killed in the
attack. A total of seven people were killed in the attack, two of which were minors. The
government claims that Al-Aulaqi's son was not the target and that the target of the attack
was not killed in the attack. If this is true, then this calls into question just how accurate
drone strikes are. It also should raise the question of why an American child was placed at
risk of death in order to attack a terror suspect. What threat did that terror suspect pose that
was so immediate and so destructive that it warranted the death of an American child?
Second, it is not impossible that an attack on an American citizen on American soil could
occur. In fact, it is not even unconstitutional. In order to understand how such an attack
could be constitutional, one must go as far back at 1878 to the Posse Comitatus Act (I 8
U.S.C. 67 §1385). The Act makes illegal the creation of a "posse comitatus" or essentially
a militia in order to enforce the law. The Act originally states "From and after the passage
of this act it shall not be lawful to employ any part of the Army of the United States, as a
posse comitatns, or otherwise, for the purpose of executing the laws, except in such cases
and under such circumstances as such employment of said force may be expressly
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authorized by the Constitution or by act of Congress ... " The President, accordingly, cannot
use the military within the United States of America to enforce law, unless Congress
expressly authorizes it.
When the restriction within the Posse Comitatus Act is coupled with the allowance of
presidential power within the A.U.M.F., it is possible that the President could use the
military within the United States if it were being used to eliminate a threat to the American
people associated with al Qaeda or the Taliban. In fact, the President has a military force
within the United States that acts as a peace-keeping force. The military group is named the
Consequence Management Reaction Force, or C.C.M.R.F., and is comprised of active and
reserve members of the Army. The force typically acts to contain chemical, biological,
radiological, nuclear, and high yield explosives (together these threats are known as
C.B.R.N.E.). The group was used as recently as 2005 in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina
in New Orleans. In theory, the group could also be deployed if a C.B .R.N.E. threat came
from an individual associated with al Qaeda or the Taliban in order to remove the threat. If
drones are as safe and as accurate as is claimed by the President and his administration, it is
not a far leap from C.C.M.R.F. then to the use of drones to neutralize a domestic threat
instead.
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Chapter 6

CONCLUSIONS

In attempting to answer my initial question, the prev1ous five chapters pose more

complicated questions regarding the use of drones in targeted killings rather than answering
the originally posed question. The legality of drone strikes, both at a domestic and an
international level, appears to be questionable at best. The morality of the attacks? Perhaps
less so. The international law pertaining to targeted killings and assassination seems to
make the practice exceptionally difficult to justify. It is not easy to ignore the striking
similarity between a targeted drone strike and a political assassination. The only difference
between them? The former is currently legal and uses brand-new state-of-the-art
technology to keep the perpetrator safely away from the intended target and the latter is
illegal according to both domestic law and international laws.
While there are many domestic Supreme Court cases that would appear to allow for the
President to have the ultimate authority over issue of national security and international
issue, one must take into account that the Constitution then may not apply when the
President is acting on the international scene. There is an argument to be made that then
citizens of the United States who travel abroad may open themselves up to attacks by
drones or the revocation of their rights under the Constitution. But is staying at home,
within the borders of the United States any safer? We know now that there are intelligence
gathering agencies that exist within the United States that are monitoring phone calls, text
messages, emails, social media, etc. in order to seek out threats to national security. We
also know that American citizens have been placed on C.I.A. and J.S.O.C. kill lists in the
past. The is an argument to be made theoretically that the Authorization for Use of Military
Force Act could allow the President to remove the ban created in the Posse Comitatus Act.
We know that the President has military forces in the United States that mobilize in order to
help in times of crisis and that terrorist attacks fall in that category.
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Given all that we know, it is not hard to replace that domestic military force with a remote
controlled drone that could more safely and effectively (according to the President) remove
terrorist threats. Lastly, we know that the United States has acted against American citizens
who it has regarded as a threat in the past. Why, then, should it not be possible to mobilize
a drone strike against an American citizen on American soil if the threat is inuuinent
enough to demand such actions?
There are yet some things that remain that we do not know. There are no concrete reports
on how accurate drones are. There is no information about how people are selected to be
attacked by a target drone strike. There are no reports on just how many causalities have
been caused by drone strikes overseas, nor is there any information on how many people
have died despite not being the target. We have yet to learn the outcome of Al-Aulaqi v.

Panetta, et. al. The case will be an important part of deciding just how much power the
President possesses to attack American citizens on foreign soil. Will the recent habeas
corpus cases such as Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, and Boumediene v. Bush
rule over the lack of due process in the Al-Aulaqi case? Or will United States v. Curtiss-

Wright Export Corp. hold and give the President the ultimate power to malce decision effect
foreign matters and national security? Is the targeted killing of an American citizen by the
United States overseas a domestic or an international issue?
It seems as if until the methods, rational, and legality of targeted killings and the selection

of targets become more clearly understood their use should remain illegal and the drone
strikes should remain unused. The argument that they should be used and that their use will
cause them to become legalized seems to be an abuse of the method of creation of
customary international law. These killings through use of drone strikes are tantamount to
assassination as it stands now. The only, very slight difference between targeted killings
and assassinations is that it has been agreed upon that assassinations are illegal, whereas the
legality of targeted killings is still in question. It is as if in order to be allowed to use
assassinations once more, governments have renamed assassinations and gathered new
teclmology to attempt to put the matter back on the table for more debate. Or perhaps they
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are hoping to skip the debate by removing any information about how the method works or
how the targets are decided.
Targeted killings used by the United States are justified by Congress through the use of
self-defense. The issues that arise out of the use of a self-defense excuse are numerous. One
is whether or not a state must wait to. be attacked before they are allo.wed to retaliate o.r if a
state may defend itself when an attack is imminent in order to. prevent casualties. This leads
to the question of how imminent must an attack be in order for a state to act. Why should a
state wait to attack and risk the lives of its citizens and its natural resources in the process?
How long can a self-defense attack last and ho.w proportional are the methods used? How
proportional should the self-defense be? How large must an attack (o.r potential attack) be
to justify retaliation (or preemptio.n)? Is an attack against one citizen enough? Onehundred? One-thousand? One-million?
Another issue is ho.w long can a self-defense excuse be used? A decade must be too long to
retaliate. Is one year too long of a retaliation then? Is one month? Self-defense must also be
proportional. How many of your own people can you sacrifice to attack a target? How
many of innocent-bystanders can you sacrifice to reach your end goaJO That becomes
difficult to ascertain when reports differ as to how many drone strikes have occurred, how
accurate they are, and how many people have already died as a result of the attacks.
Problems arise in the definition of those who are killed as well. Who is an enemy
belligerent and who is a civilian? Even then, what sort of due process rights do enemy
belligerents deserve, if any? What sort of due process rights does a citizen deserve before
his or her life is taken in an attack? Surely the answer must be at least equal to, if not more,
than the due process afforded to the enemy belligerent. What happens if an enemy
belligerent is a citizen?
An issue that this paper does not discuss, but that is rather important, is how effect drones
are in preventing terrorism. According to the Rise of the Drones meeting, many people in
the countries in which the attacks are occurring see the attacks. They understand that it is
the United States that has the technology to swoop from the skies in a plane without a pilot
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inside to attack and kill someone near them. They see that there is some collateral damage
done in these attacks and wonder if they are the next to die. They see villages being
destroyed to get to one hostile individual, one enemy belligerent. The attacks on individuals
in villages and towns in countries where there are no battlefields like Yemen and Pakistan
appear to be creating a hatred of America. That hatred is reinforced through every attack,
whether the attack is by soldiers on foot or by umnanned aircrafts. Individuals whose lives
are effected by drone strikes are easier targets for terrorist groups looking to recruit new
members to their cause. The use of drone strikes may or may not be effective at
neutralizing current terrorist that may or may not be imminent threats to the national
security of the United States of America. That is unknown, although the groups using the
drones assure the American people that the drones are indeed effective. The problem
becomes that yes, the United States may be ridding the world of old terrorist foes, but by
doing so are they creating new and more enemies?
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FOOTNOTES
1. As there has not yet been a female in the position of President of the United States of
America, this paper will use male pronouns when referring to the President.

2. TI1ere is little information on the proliferation of this technology, how accurate the
drones are, or how soon other countries may have use of these same drones.
3. This ability is debatable due to the limited information that has been released by the
govermnent regarding drones and their targeting abilities.
4. However, there is debate on how inlminent a threat must be to skip verification of the
threat and go straight to a targeted killing of said threat.
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